Fiat-Shamir Security of SWIRL

The BCS transform turns the SWIRL IOP into a non-interactive proof. We prove in Lean that the compiled protocol stays knowledge sound in the random permutation model, and that its verifier is the one SWIRL actually runs.

PROOF BLUEPRINT

The shape of the argument

Fiat-Shamir security is proven using the BCS transformation. We prove that the BCS transformation preserves knowledge soundness when compiling an interactive oracle protocol (IOP) into a non-interactive random oracle protocol (NIROP). We apply the BCS transformation to the SWIRL IOP to get knowledge soundness of the SWIRL NIROP with respect to the BCS-compiled verifier. We then prove equivalence between this compiled verifier and the SWIRL reference verifier.

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